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Abstract 
Objectives: To report a COVID-19 outbreak among workers and inpatients at a medical ward for 
especially vulnerable patients. 
Methods: Descriptive study of a nosocomial COVID-19 outbreak registered in March-April 2020 at 
medical ward of onco-hematological patients in an Spanish hospital. Confirmed cases were hospitalized 
patients, healthcare and non-healthcare workers who tested positive by PCR on a nasopharyngeal swab.  
Results: Twenty-two COVID-19 cases (12 workers and 10 inpatients) were laboratory-confirmed. 
Initial cases were a healthcare provider and a visitor who tested positive. The median patients age was 73 
years (range 62-88). The main reason of admission was haematological in 8 patients and oncologic in 2. All 
patients followed an immunosuppressive treatment, 5/10 with high-flow oxygen nebulizations. Five 
patients presented a moderate/serious evolution, and 5 patients died. The mean workers age was 
42.1±10.9. One healthworker required Intensive Care Unit admission, and all of them recovered 
completely. 
Conclusions: In the hospital setting, close patients surveillance for SARS-CoV-2 is essential, especially in 
immunosuppressed patients. Replacing nebulizations or high-flow oxygen therapies, when other 
equivalent options were available, to reduce dispersion, and controlling ventilation ducts, together with 
hygiene measures and an active follow-up on inpatients, visitors and workers appear to be important in 
preventing nosocomial outbreaks. 
Key words: COVID-19; Coronavirus Infections; Disease outbreaks; Health personnel; Infectious Disesase 
Transmission, Patient-to-Professional; Infectious Disease Transmission, Professional-to-Patient. 
Introduction 
The disease produced by SARS-CoV-2 
(COVID-19) was identified for the first time in 
Wuhan, China, in December 2019 [1, 2]. It expanded 
rapidly, and it was declared a pandemic on 11 March 
2020 [3, 4], with identified cases in 213 countries [3].  
In Spain, the first death took place in The 
Valencian Community on 13 February 2020. On 13 
March 2020, the number of confirmed cases in Spain 
was 4,209, with 120 deaths [5]. On 30 April 2020, the 
number of confirmed cases in Spain was 213,435, with 
24,543 deaths [6]. 
The first case in Galicia (an autonomous region 
in the northwest of Spain) was identified on 4 March 








state of health emergency was declared in the Galician 
territory [7].  
The clinical spectrum of the infection caused by 
SARS-CoV-2 varies from asymptomatic, mild 
respiratory symptoms with fever and dry cough, to 
acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS), 
multi-organic dysfunction, and death [8-9]. Several 
studies have recorded between 50-60% of 
asymptomatic patients [10]. In those individuals who 
have symptoms, fever has been detected in 43-99% of 
patients (>37.3 ºC) and cough in 70-80% of them 
[11-15].  
Healthcare and non-healthcare workers who 
take care of non-COVID-19 patients have protection 
protocols and, a priori, less risk of infection. Patients 
placed in restricted units of non-COVID-19 
pathologies are also provided with these protocols. 
However, the epidemiological surveillance services 
should be diligent in order to track signs and factors 
that could determine the presence of an outbreak, 
which would have fatal consequences in vulnerable 
people.  
Nosocomial outbreaks in different health centres 
have been described in several parts of the world [10, 
16-17]. Several studies evidence the susceptibility of 
healthcare and non-healthcare workers to be infected, 
especially after being exposed to patients initially not 
suspected of COVID-19, who are likely to transmit the 
virus at the pre-symptomatic or asymptomatic stages 
[18-23]. The fact that sometimes this disease is present 
almost without symptoms could mean a bigger risk in 
non-COVID-19 units. 
This study reports an outbreak of COVID-19 
among healthcare workers, non-healthcare workers 
and inpatients at a unit of haematological and internal 
medicine patients in a tertiary referral Spanish 
hospital. The aim of the investigation is to explore the 
causes and characteristics of the outbreak, as well as 
the measures implemented in order to prevent and 
control it. The results may suggest factors that can 
contribute to the propagation of the infection in 
hospitals, in order to minimize the infections in these 
centres in the future. 
Material and Methods 
Outbreak setting 
The outbreak occurred in March and April 2020, 
at a medical ward in A Coruña University Hospital. 
This is a 1348-bed tertiary hospital serving a 
population of 501,526 inhabitants in the Northwest of 
Spain. 
The contingency plan implemented during the 
pandemic followed the national and international 
recommendations. Thus, care units for patients with 
COVID-19 were created, with well-defined circuits 
from the admission, with the objective of minimizing 
risks both for patients and for workers. 
The Unit where the outbreak was registered has 
34 beds that, according to the hospital reorganization 
during the pandemic, was destined for patients with 
acute pathologies (non-COVID-19) that required the 
assistance of Haematologist, Oncologist, or Internal 
Medicine doctors. According to the hospital protocol, 
during this period only the visit of one relative was 
allowed (under 70 years old and without symptoms) 
per patient. 
The ward comprises an area of 368 m2, with 15 
double or triple rooms and 1 nursing station, 1 
doctor’s office, 1 security control y 2 storage rooms. 
There is a single point of entry without direct access to 
other units. The floor plan of the hospital ward is 
shown in Figure 1. When the first case was confirmed, 
34 out of the 34 beds of the ward were occupied. The 
air passage in the unit goes through an independent 
channel on each side, located at the entrance of the 
unit (Figure 1). The airflow goes from the entrance to 
the end of the floor through inside of all of the rooms. 
This is not a unit that is actively ventilated due to the 
characteristics of immunosuppression of its patients 
(especially rooms 901, 902, 903, 915, and 916). 
 
 
Figure 1. Distribution of the Unit, entrance, and direction of the airflow. The beds of the infected patients are highlighted in bold. 





Figure 2. Diagnosis of cases in patients and workers. 
 
The Unit team has 28 healthcare workers (4 
doctors: 2 internists, 1 haematologist, and 1 
oncologist, 14 nurses, 10 nursing assistants), and 
non-healthcare workers (1 cleaner). During the 
pandemic, both workers and patients were required 
to wear a surgical mask, to keep the interpersonal 
distance whenever possible, and to wash their hands 
before and after any contact with patients, devices or 
their surroundings. The healthcare professionals were 
informed of the need to communicate the centre if 
they had a fever or any other symptoms compatible 
with this infection. The centre had a hotline for 
workers to solve doubts and to inform of sick leave in 
case of not coming to the hospital. 
Case definitions and identification 
The population examined were inpatients, 
healthcare workers (doctors, nurses, nursing 
assistants) and non-healthcare workers (cleaning 
staff) of the unit.  
The confirmed cases are defined as inpatients, 
healthcare or non-healthcare workers with a positive 
Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) test for 
SARS-CoV-2 in the analysis of a nasopharyngeal 
sample obtained through a swab. Samples were taken 
to the Microbiology service both for inpatients and for 
outpatients. As for the latter, the samples were 
obtained in a dedicated testing site next to the 
hospital, named Auto-COVID (the patient arrives in 
their car and they are tested without getting out). In 
both cases, a nurse carried out the test, according to 
the protocol and procedure of the hospital. 
Measurements 
This study was authorized by the Hospital 
General Management in compliance with national 
and regional regulations. Demographic characteristics 
were registered for each case, as well as previous 
comorbidities. In addition, for infected patients, their 
diagnosis, treatment with immunosuppressants or 
not, high-flow oxygen nebulizations, active 
concomitant infections, and ECOG scale of 
performance status were also recorded [24]. 
Laboratory studies and X-ray images were not 
registered.  
In accordance with the patients' symptoms, the 
seriousness of the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2 was 
divided into four classes: mild, moderate, severe, and 
critical [25-27]. We also add the “asymptomatic” 
category to our study.  
If patients have slight clinical symptoms without 
pneumonia or hypoxia they are treated as having a 
mild condition. When patients have clinical signs of 
pneumonia (fever, cough, dyspnoea, fast breathing, 
fingertip blood oxygen saturation >90%) and do not 
fit severe or critical group, they are identified as 
having a moderate condition. Severe condition 
applies when patients experience respiratory distress 
and a respiratory rate of >30 times per minute and a 
fingertip blood oxygen saturation of <90% at rest. 
Patients were regarded as having a critical condition if 
they had any of the following: respiratory failure 
requiring mechanical ventilation, shock, and other 
organ failures requiring ICU treatment [25-27]. 
In-hospital deaths were recorded. 





Table 1. Global characteristics of positive COVID-19 patients.  
Patients 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Age 79 67 88 78 62 73 77 73 69 63 
Sex F F F F M M M M M M 
HTA Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Dyslipidemia Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Diabetes No No No No No No Yes No No No 
Obesity No No Yes No No No No No Yes No 
Pulmonary disease No Yes Yes No No Yes No No Yes No 
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No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
ECOG 0 4 4 4 3 4 4 2 3 1 
Nebulizations / 
high flow O2 
No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No Yes No 
PCR-COVID - No No 20-03-202 No No 28/03/
2020 








05/03/2020 05/03/2020 06/04/2020 
COVID severity 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 
Death No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No No 
ECOG: 0 Fully active, 1 Restricted in physically strenuous activity, 2 Capable of all self-care, unable to carry out any work activities, 3 Capable of only limited self-care, 4 
Completely disabled, 5 Dead. Covid severity: 1 Asymptomatic, 2 Mild: Mild symptoms 3 Moderate: fever or respiratory symptoms, 4 Severe: saturation <93%, 5 Critical 
(ICU); HTA: Arterial hypertension, F: female, M: male 
 
Table 2. Global characteristics of positive COVID-19 workers.  
Workers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Age 32 47 34 34 29 47 57 62 28 45 42 48 
Sex M M F F F F F F M F F F 
HTA No No No No No No Yes No No No No No 
Dyslipidemia No No No No No No Yes No No No No No 
Diabetes No No No No No No No No No No No No 
Obesity Yes No No No No No No No No No Yes No 
COPD No No No No No No No No No No Yes No 
Renal disease No No No No No No No No No No No No 
PCR-COVID + 14/03/20 02/04/20 04/04/20 04/04/20 04/04/20 04704/20 05/04/20 06/04/20 06/04/20 07/04720 07/04/20 14/04/20 
COVID severity 5 3 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 
Death No No No No No No No No No No No No 
Covid severity: 1 Asymptomatic, 2 Mild: Mild symptoms 3 Moderate: mild respiratory distress (saturation>90%), 4 Severe: saturation <90%, 5 Critical (ICU); HTA: Arterial 
hypertension; COPD: chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, F: female, M: male. 
 
Outbreak description and control measures 
The case detection sequence is represented in 
Figure 2. Tables 1 and 2 show the characteristics of the 
patients and workers affected, respectively, along 
with their evolution.  
On 13 March 2020, the Department of Preventive 
Medicine was informed of a potential case of infection 
by SARS-CoV 2 in a healthcare worker of the 
Haematology-Internal Medicine Unit, who showed 
non-productive cough (HCW 1). One co-habitant of 
this worker, who had travelled to a risk area on the 
East coast of Spain in which the number of cases had 
been increasing, presented identical symptomatology 
a week before. The first day HCW 1 experienced 
symptoms (13 March), the Department of Preventive 
Medicine was notified. He was quarantined at home 
until the performance of the PCR test. A contact 
tracing in the unit was not performed at that point 
since it was considered that the infectiousness of the 
disease started in the symptomatic stage, and HCW 1 
had followed the hospital instructions, had worked 
with a surgical mask, and had not presented any 
previous symptoms [28]. 
HCW 1 had worked in rooms 901 and 902 during 
the morning shift of the 11 and 12 March. The test was 
carried out on 14 March, which was positive for 
SARS-CoV-2, as well as the test carried out to his 
co-habitant on 15 March, which was also positive. In 
the following days, new cases in patients and 
companions who had been in rooms 901 and 902 were 
identified.  




The first case in inpatients was detected in a 
Haematology patient with immunosuppressive 
treatment (PCR positive on 16 March) who was in 
room 901 and was discharged on 13 March. Later, on 
16 March, she was admitted to another unit with 
compatible symptomatology with COVID-19. Since 
the patient did not re-enter the same unit and she was 
treated by the worker in the pre-symptomatic stage of 
the disease, an epidemiologic link was not initially 
established. 
Patients 2 (PCR positive on 19 March) and 3 
(PCR positive on 23 March) also suffered hemopathies 
and they shared room 902. A PCR test for 
SARS-CoV-2 was requested for patient 2 due to 
compatible symptoms. Her companion, after the 
diagnosis, informed of having experienced symptoms 
(fever and cough) for several days when he attended 
the Hospital as a companion. He explained that he did 
not report it in order not to separate from their 
relative, who had a very unfavourable prognosis with 
foreseeable death. He was tested on the same day as 
the patient, with a positive result. Patient 2 was 
rapidly progressing their disease and had previous 
comorbidities. On the day of the diagnosis and before 
knowing the companion's situation, the patient 
received high-flow oxygen therapy and 
bronchodilators nebulized due to acute respiratory 
deterioration. It is worth to highlight that on the same 
day when patient 3 was examined as a close contact of 
patient 2, she initially tested negative (PCR on 19 
March). Since there were no symptoms, and having 
into account complications and previous 
comorbidities, isolating was interrupted. However, 
she experienced fever after 3 days, and the test result 
was positive. In this case, the patient underwent a 
high-flow oxygen therapy as well as nebulized 
bronchodilators for practically her whole stay. After 
the results, all patients that tested positive were 
referred to a COVID-19 unit. 
Patient 4 (room 903), also an haematology 
patient, tested positive by PCR on 31 March. She 
suffered from a disease with unfavourable short-term 
prognosis and was following an immunosuppressive 
treatment, in addition to other serious complications. 
She had experienced fever on 28 March, but that was 
linked to their complications and basal disease. 
However, after 3 days the fever reappeared, and 
although she had not had, a priori, contact with any 
known positive cases nor did she show any 
deteriorated respiratory condition, the PCR test was 
positive. The patient undertook low-flow oxygen 
therapy via nasal cannulas.  
On 2 April 2020, both a nurse (HCW 2) and a 
patient (Patient 5, room 915) tested positive by PCR. 
The patient was haematological and was following an 
immunosuppressive treatment, and was tested 
because of fever without another symptomatology. 
HCW 2 had fever for 3 days and was isolated at home 
since the beginning of the symptoms. 
After these results, a screening of the patients 
who were in the Unit was carried out. On 3 April, 
patient 6 and 7 (both in room 914) tested positive by 
PCR. These were two patients with cancer at a very 
advanced stage of their disease and other 
comorbidities.  
In addition, a screening of all the workers of the 
floor started, obtaining positive results in 4 workers 
on 4 April (3 nurses and 1 cleaner). When a survey 
was carried out, workers who tested positive 
informed that they had only experienced anosmia. 
The rest of the asymptomatic workers who had been 
in contact with these patients were isolated at home 
and a PCR test was scheduled for 7 days after the risk 
contact. 
On 5 April, patients 8 and 9 tested positive by 
PCR (rooms 915 and 916 respectively), both with 
haematological pathologies, following an 
immunosuppressive treatment, and both presented 
fever; as well as worker 7. Patient 8 tested negative on 
the test carried out on the same day as their 
roommate, who had tested positive (patient 5). Patient 
9 had several negative previous tests but suffered 
from acute respiratory pathology through all their 
stay, which is why he was following treatment with 
aerosol-generating respiratory techniques, including 
non-invasive mechanical ventilation (NIMV). HCW 7 
experienced general discomfort from the day before. 
The last patient who tested positive in this 
outbreak was patient 10 (PCR positive on 6 April), 
room 901, who experienced fever and had also tested 
negative previously.  
The rest of the staff who tested positive by PCR 
were 3 nurses (one on 6 April and two on 7 April) and 
2 nursing assistants (on 6 April and 14 April). They 
were all isolated at home from the start of the 
screening (3 April). Both nurses and assistants 
experienced fever a day before the diagnosis.  
Results 
Between 14 March and 15 April 2020, the total 
number of positive PCR tests for SARS-CoV-2 in this 
outbreak was 22 (12 workers y 10 inpatients). The first 
identified cases were HCW 1 and patient's 2 
companion.  
The number of patients who tested positive by 
PCR was 10 (4 women and 6 men). During the period 
when the nosocomial outbreak was identified, 60 
patients were admitted to the unit, which shows a 
cumulative incidence of 16.7%. The average patient 
age was 72.9±8.0 years old (range: 62-88). The reason 




for admission was haematological in 8 patients and 
cancer conditions in other 2. Seven out of 10 patients 
were ECOG 3 (n=2) or 4 (n=5). All patients followed 
an immunosuppressive treatment, 5/10 with 
high-flow oxygen nebulizations and 8/10 presented a 
concomitant active infection. 
Out of the total number of positive patients, 5 
(50%) presented a moderate or serious evolution, 
without needing ICU admission. The other 5 patients 
died (3 haematological (37.5%) and 2 with cancer 
(100%)). Death occurred in patients with a very 
unfavourable evolution of their haematological 
diseases or cancer, with an estimated prognosis of less 
than 3 months.  
The number of positive workers was 12 (9 
women and 3 men), with an average age of 42.1±10.9 
years old (range: 28-62 years old). The distribution of 
professional categories of affected workers was as 
follows: 7 nurses, 3 nursing assistants, and 1 cleaner. 
With regards to the evolution of the workers’ disease, 
HCW 1 required admission to the ICU for 32 days 
(critical) and a nurse needed hospital admission 
(moderate), both presented previous pathologies 
(Table 2). The rest of the workers did not require 
admission, experiencing mild or moderate symptoms. 
None of the workers died and they all recovered 
completely. 
The distribution of the positive cases in the unit 
was well-defined (rooms 901, 902, 903, 914, 915, and 
916), all of them were located in the first rooms, close 
to the entrance of the unit, where the airflow through 
two parallel impellers began.  
Five patients with positive PCR tests were 
treated with procedures that generated aerosols at the 
start of the outbreak (patient’s numbers 2, 3, 6, 7, and 
9). There were no positive patients of COVID-19 in 
any of the rooms of the centre nor the end of the unit. 
The last case was diagnosed on 14 April, a worker, a 
month after the first case.  
Discussion 
This study shows the complexity of the approach 
of a nosocomial infection outbreak by SARS-CoV-2 
and its impact, particularly in an area of vulnerable 
patients. The analysis reveals that the hospital areas 
designated to non-COVID-19 patients can be a 
high-risk environment for a SARS-CoV-2 outbreak.  
Workers or companions, who interact in 
environments inside and outside the hospital, can be 
the start of the outbreak, although infected patients 
contribute to the diffusion of pathogens, and it is key 
to reduce or to prevent the spread of the infectious 
agent from its source. 
Therefore, staff working in non-COVID-19 
admissions areas follow protocols adapted to low-risk 
patients. This includes surgical masks (for workers 
and patients), adequate hand hygiene, and keeping a 
distance of at least 1.5 meters whenever possible, as 
well as to know and notify any symptoms that could 
suggest the disease by SARS-CoV-2. However, even in 
groups trained in preventive measures and with a 
high level of compliance, these recommendations may 
not be enough when they are exposed to a focus, 
particularly when the focus is initially unknown. In 
our case, the initial transmission from the very first 
case of the unit during the pre-symptomatic phase 
was identified (HCW1). The spread was also 
identified afterwards between patients and workers, 
contributing to the fast dissemination of the virus 
through the Unit, which has been described in other 
healthcare centres [19-21]. On this matter, infection 
control and dissemination strategies based on 
monitoring after the start of symptoms, seemed 
insufficient to prevent the transmission, and 
especially if a case was already identified [10]. 
In this outbreak, the scale of the problem 
included half of the workers of the unit, with a clinical 
favourable evolution in most of them, except in one 
that required ICU admission. 
Half of the patients who suffered from the 
outbreak died due to their disease and other 
comorbidities, not receiving Intensive Care Unit 
assistance.  
Restricting relatives’ visits in an epidemic is part 
of the infection control strategies. However, in the 
case of terminally-ill patients, the decision of the 
families to remain with them until the very end can 
lead them to hide their symptoms or a known 
infection, putting into risk a group of people. 
These threats should be fought against with 
adequate information, individual responsibility, and 
actions directed from the alert and epidemiologic 
tracking services. As of the epidemiological 
surveillance, the strategy developed by the alert and 
epidemiologic tracking services seemed inefficient 
since it did not consider the asymptomatic phase like 
a period of risk, and did not have a system which 
allowed to carry out the traceability of cases between 
patients and workers promptly. 
On the other hand, 50% of patients with 
SARS-Cov-2 disease received medical treatment with 
aerosol-generating techniques. Transmission through 
aerosols is biologically possible, and thus it has been 
shown in different studies [18]. Real suspension times 
in the environment can increase when there are 
significant crossed flows, which is often the case in 
medical care environments [27]. For example, doors 
that open, teams and beds moving around, people 
going up and down constantly, although we have not 




seen that the evolution of the outbreak followed the 
direction of the airflows of the Unit.  
Joshua L. Santarpia et al. [29] present 13 
individuals with COVID-19 in the University of 
Nebraska Medical Center. They took air and surface 
samples and they detected viral contamination in all 
the samples, which led them to conclude that 
SARS-CoV-2 could spread both through direct 
mechanisms (little drops and person to person) and 
indirect (contaminated objects and air transmission). 
In another study carried [30], high concentrations of 
the virus were found in poorly ventilated areas and in 
the absence of negative pressure. In the ICUs, with 
adequate ventilation and negative pressure, the load 
was lower. This was also the case in the areas 
designated to changing the PPE (Personal Protective 
Equipment), suggesting that movement could 
reintroduce in the airflow particles adhered to the 
PPE. 
On this matter, surgical masks are designed to 
block the big particles, drops, and aerosols, but they 
are less efficient to block aerosols of small particles 
(less than 5 μm). That’s why healthcare workers that 
carry out aerosol-generation procedures in patients 
with SARS-CoV-2 are required to wear other 
protective equipment, in accordance with the 
recommendations public health organisations [31, 32]. 
In addition, there is epidemiologic data that proves 
that aerosol-generation procedures increase the health 
risk for workers during the SARS epidemic. 
However, in the meta-analysis of Tran K, et al. 
[33] that studies the evidence of acute respiratory 
infections transmission risk in healthcare workers, the 
transmission risk associated to the nebulizing 
treatment was not statistically significant (two cohort 
studies; pooled OR 3.7; 95% CI 0.7, 19.5). These 
findings must be interpreted in the context of the very 
low quality of the studies. 
We thought that, in the outbreak described, it 
could not be discarded the possibility that the 
generation of aerosols could have influenced the 
spread of the virus. Future researches could help 
identify places and practices of work in which the 
transmission via aerosols is more likely to occur, so 
exposition risks and controls can be more efficient 
[34]. Nowadays, recommendations for prevention and 
infection control related to healthcare assistance in a 
pandemic period, suggest avoiding the use of 
techniques that generate aerosols, if there are 
therapeutic alternatives. 
Patients that present onco-haematological 
pathologies are especially vulnerable to infections in 
general, and to SARS-CoV-2 in particular. They also 
show a less favourable clinical evolution, with more 
serious cases and a higher death rate. In a cohort 
study carried out in two centres in Wuhan, China, by 
Wenjuan He et al. [34], they show 10% of COVID-19 
incidence in haematological patients, which is much 
higher than in any other oncological patients, but it is 
similar to the rate observed in workers of the centre 
(7%). However, mortality differs in both groups: 62% 
in onco-haematological patients and 0% in workers, 
concluding that the incidence is similar in both 
groups, but it is much more serious in 
onco-haematological patients than in workers, which 
is what we have observed in our little study [35]. In 
this sense, they state that an increase in mortality can 
be due to concomitant infections (similar to our study) 
in addition to the condition of immunosuppression. 
They conclude that this type of inpatients should be 
subsidiary of special isolation as well as special and 
rigorous clinical surveillance in the context of a 
pandemic.  
Other investigations [36, 37], also in China, 
suggest a greater incidence of serious infection in 
patients with cancer than in patients without known 
neoplasia (39% vs 8%). Yu J et al. [37] suggest that 
frequent admissions to the Hospital and periodic 
checks, that are inherent to this type of patients, could 
therefore influence their susceptibility to getting 
COVID-19, due to a higher exposition risk. 
Lastly, Malard et al., in a French study, observe 
almost 50% of incidence, with a non-favourable 
evolution in a high percentage [38]. They conclude 
that patients with haematological neoplasia are more 
susceptible to COVID-19 and to experience a more 
severe disease and as a consequence, greater mortality 
(they estimate 40% per month). In the same way, they 
observe that in most of the patients a nosocomial 
origin is suspected and that they present at least one 
added comorbidity.  
In conclusion, this nosocomial outbreak of 
SARS-CoV-2 in an Haematology-Internal Medicine 
Unit is likely to have its origins in the community 
environment, being the initial cases a healthcare 
provider and/or a companion who tested positive. 
However, the concurrence of multiple cases favoured 
its spread. Therefore, we considered that the 
following preventive and control measures in 
non-COVID-19 Units were necessary to avoid a 
nosocomial outbreak:  
• Surveil and track every case due to the 
possibility of infections at least 48h before 
symptoms, both in patients and workers, and 
keeping an active follow-up both on inpatients 
and outpatients. With regard to workers, they 
should notify symptoms immediately to the 
Preventive Medicine Department as well as to 
self-isolate.  




• Reduce generating aerosols by nebulizations or 
high-flow oxygen therapies, which can boost the 
spread of high viral loads in an environment that 
normally does not present an adequate 
ventilation. Replace them with equivalent 
therapies with the use of a closed chamber, if this 
is not possible, could increase the personal 
protection of workers. 
• Clean thoroughly the designated areas for 
patients and professionals due to the possibility 
of viral particles left in the surfaces to return to 
the air or to favour the spread via contact.  
• Control and verify the ventilation of the rooms 
and the connections between these, since they 
can facilitate the viral propagation (for instance, 
when opening windows), or perhaps assessing 
the temporary suspension of the ventilation.  
• Close onco-haematological patients surveillance, 
which are more susceptible to get the disease 
and to present a most serious evolution due to 
their immunosuppression. 
Results from this study has been taken into 
account in order to change the hospital policy. At this 
time, all patients are screened with PCR at admission 
and after 7 days (at 2 and 7 days after admission if 
baseline PCR was not available). In the presence of a 
confirmed case in a hospitalization ward, whether of 
health personnel, non-health personnel or a patient, 
all patients and workers of the ward are screened with 
PCR. Positives cases are isolated and the PCR 
screening is repeated after 5-7 days to all the 
personnel and patients. This is done successively until 
no positive is identified. At the present time, the 
rooms are more ventilated, no aerosols are generated, 
replacing them with cameras, and only one 
companion per patient wearing a mask is allowed. It 
should be noted the existence of greater PCR tests 
availability and higher traceability capacity at the 
present time. 
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